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INTRODUCTION
For more than 200 years, the United States government has
possessed the power to confiscate property through forfeiture.' Laws
authorizing the forfeiture of property used in illegal activities, such as
customs offenses and piracy, were among the earliest statutes enacted
by Congress.2 During the early years of the nation, forfeiture laws
served vital national interests, allowing for vessel forfeitures in times
of war as well as seizure of Confederate property during the Civil
1. Forfeiture is "some real or personal property to which the right is lost by the
commission of a crime or fault." BLACt'S lAw DICIONARY 584 (6th ed. 1990). Forfeiture
statutes were among the first laws enacted by Congress following the adoption of the
Constitution. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (stating
that statutes enabling vessel forfeitures were enacted immediately after adoption of Constitu-
tion); see also Arthur W. Leach &John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropiate Solution to
the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 247 n.25 (1994) (noting early roots and
modem applications of forfeiture laws); AnthonyJ. Franze, Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil
Forfeiture, and the Plight of the "Innocent Owner," 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 369, 373-75 (1994)
(setting forth early applications of forfeiture statutes).
2. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 119 (1993) (plurality opinion)
(noting that First Congress enacted criminal forfeiture statutes authorizing seizure of ships
utilized in customs offenses); Cj. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943) (articulating
that Colonies enforced forfeiture statutes before adoption of Constitution).
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War.' Today, forfeiture is playing an expanded role in fighting a new
war: the war against drugs.4
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention
Control Act5 ("the Act" or "§ 881") in 1970 to broaden the powers of
the federal government in combatting drugs.' Originally the Act
enabled the government to institute civil forfeiture actions against
property used to facilitate illegal narcotics transactions.7 Such
"facilitating property" most often includes automobiles, aircraft, and
boats used to transport illegal narcotics,8 or homes used to conduct
narcotics transactions.9 Congress eventually determined that civil
3. SeeUnited States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,81 (1993) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[S]ince the Civil War (the Supreme Court has]
upheld statutes allowing for the civil forfeiture of real property."); 1 DAVID B. SMITH,
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASE § 2.01, at 2-2 (tracing historical uses of civil
forfeiture laws); Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 248 (analyzing history of forfeiture laws);
Franze, supra note 1, at 375 (setting forth early uses of forfeiture statutes).
4. See Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. at 1190 (plurality opinion) (describing modem forfeiture
as significant expansion of governmental power); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989) ("Forfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the war on crime.").
5. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
6. See Buena Viuta Ave., 507 U.S. at 119.
7. SeePub. L. No. 91-511, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970); see also 116 CONG. REc. 977-78
(1970) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (emphasizing that Comprehensive DrugAbuse andPrevention
Act was "strictly and entirely a law enforcement measure.., designed to crack down hard on
the narcotics pusher and the illegal diverters of pep pills and goofballs"). Ironically, in all of
the debates, no one criticized the forfeiture provisions. The only time forfeiture was mentioned
was before the final vote. Senator Hruska, while summarizing the bill, remarked that the
forfeiture provisions "were for the most part carried over from existing law" and that the
provisions would take the "much needed mobility" away from drug traffickers. Id. at 1665
(statement of Sen. Hruska). The bill passed the Senate with a vote of 82-0. See id. at 1671.
8. See21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4). For purposes of this Note, forfeiture under § 881 (a) (4) will
be referred to as "forfeiture of facilitating property." Section 881(a) (4) provides in relevant
part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft. vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or
(9).
ldt
9. See id. § 881(a) (7). For purposes of this Note, forfeiture under § 881(a) (7) also will be
referred to as "forfeiture of facilitating property." Subsections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) will not be
distinguished because they both involve property that facilitates illegal narcotics activity. The
only difference between the two subsections is the types of property that can constitute
facilitating property. Section 881(a) (7) provides in relevant part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment ....
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forfeitures pursuant to the Act were not fulfilling their anticipated
goals. I0 To remedy this shortcoming, Congress amended § 881,
granting the government power to confiscate proceeds traceable to
illegal narcotics transactions in addition to facilitating property."
Forfeiture of "proceeds" can include money or anything of value
exchanged for illegal drugs, as well as a home or any property
purchased with such money. 2 Although forfeiture of proceeds and
facilitating property under § 881 have proven to be the most effective
Id. Congress included § 881(a) (7) as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), § 511(a) (7), 98 Stat. 1837, 2050. Forfeitures under § 881 (a) (7)
most often occur when a home is used to have meetings to arrange drug transactions or the
transactions actually take place in the home. See Franze, supra note 1, at 381 (citing United
States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1994)).
10. In 1984, Congress reviewed a report of the General Accounting Office that found that
asset forfeiture was not being pursued aggressively under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act. SeeS. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1984), reprfnted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN.
3182, 3374.
11. Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6) as part of the Psychotropic Substances Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777. Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7)
as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See i&. § 306(a).
12. See21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). For the purposes of this Note, forfeitures pursuant to § 881
(a)(6) will be referred to as "forfeiture of proceeds." Section 881 (a)(6) provides in relevant
part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.
Id This section allows for the forfeiture of property in three situations. First, forfeiture cases
under the "exchange" provision usually involve instances when the only evidence of an exchange
is the proximity of large quantities of money discovered near drugs or drug paraphernalia. See
i&t; Franze, supra note 1, at 379 (discussing situations where forfeitures involving proceeds arise).
Other instances often involve a person carrying a large sum of money and acting in a suspicious
manner. See id. Second, forfeiture under the "proceeds" provision allows for the forfeiture of
all proceeds traceable to an illegal drug exchange. See id. The term "proceeds" is used in this
section to mean property derived from money or other things of value that are directly
exchanged for drugs. See id at 379 n.55. If probable cause exists that a home or any other
property was purchased with money obtained as "proceeds" from illegal drug transactions, then
the property may be forfeited to the government. See id Finally, all monies, negotiable
instruments, and securities exchanged or intended to be exchanged for drugs are subject to
forfeiture under this provision. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6).
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and most utilized' weapons in the nation's war on drugs, they also
have been among the most controversial. 4
In United States v. Ursery,'5 the Supreme Court expanded the
government's forfeiture powers pursuant to § 881, permitting parallel
criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture of property involved in drug
offenses. 6 The Court determined that such concurrent proceedings
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's' 7 protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that forfeiture of proceeds
and facilitating property pursuant to § 881 constituted a remedial civil
sanction and therefore was not punitive. 9 Specifically, the Court
determined that because civil forfeitures did not constitute punish-
ment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, forfeitures could not violate
the Constitution's protection against double jeopardy.2" Although
the Court's decision gave the government more leverage to combat
drugs, it did so at the expense of defendants' Fifth Amendment
rights.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court unnecessarily abridged
drug offenders' Fifth Amendment protections at a time when law
enforcement resources far outweigh those of most defendants.2
Part I reviews the procedural advantages of civil forfeiture proceedings
that make such actions a powerful tool for federal prosecutors. Part
II sets forth the legal standards relevant to any double jeopardy
13. The Office of the United States Attorney General has reported that revenue derived
from forfeitures is a source of invaluable funds that are reinvested into federal, state, local, and
international law enforcement agencies to fight the war against drugs. See 1994 DEP'T OFJUSTIcE
ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM ANN. REP. 18 (1994). More than $3.8 billion in illegal cash and
proceeds from the sale ofproperty have been deposited into the Fund since 1985. See id. at 19.
Approximately $1.4 billion has been shared by the federal government with state and local law
enforcement agencies. See id. The Justice Department also shares drug seizure funds with
foreign countries that assist in U.S. law enforcement activities. See id. at 18-20. Sharing the
funds with foreign governments secures the ongoing cooperation necessary for effective law
enforcement. See id.
14. See Franze, supra note 1, at 376 (stating that § 881 is the "most criticized statute to
combat the war on drugs").
15. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
16. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. See Ursely, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (emphasizing traditional understanding that civil forfeiture
does not constitute punishment for purpose of Double Jeopardy Clause).
19. See id. at 2142.
20. See id.
21. See Rory K Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355, 364 & n.39 (1996) (discussing large budget increases for FBI, DEA, and Customs, as
well as increase in prosecutorial resources); Greg Hallon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A
Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 HARV. C.L-C.L. L. REV. 499, 502 (1996) ("Asset forfeiture has given
U.S. attorneys and federal law enforcement agencies enhanced access to resources while
simultaneously reducing the resources available to defendants.").
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challenge. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's decisions involving
civil forfeiture and the DoubleJeopardy Clause. Part IV examines the
rationales underlying Sixth and Ninth Circuit decisions that the
Supreme Court reversed in Ursery. Part V reviews the Supreme
Court's holding and rationale in Ursery. Part VI analyzes the Court's
application of precedent relevant to Ursery. In particular, Part VI
discusses the previously apparent requirement that a second civil
sanction must serve a "solely remedial" purpose to avoid invoking the
protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part VI also argues that
forfeitures pursuant to § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) do not fit this
characteristic because they are punitive in nature. Part VII suggests
that the Court in Ursery reduced the degree of Fifth Amendment
protection afforded to defendants by permitting the government to
proceed both criminally and civilly against drug offenders. Conse-
quently, the government can take advantage of the more favorable
procedures offered in civil forfeiture proceedings, in which defen-
dants should receive the constitutional protections mandated in
criminal proceedings. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court
applied an obscure line of cases in place of a sound and long-relied
upon line of cases.
I. PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The Supreme Court determined in Various Items of Personal Property
v. United States 2 that civil forfeitures are in rem actions, stating that
"[i] t is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a
legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient."23 In contrast, criminal forfei-
tures are classified as "in personam proceedings instituted as part of the
criminal case against a defendant."24  The in rem status of civil
forfeitures enables the government to avoid the procedural safeguards
22. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
23. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931); see alfo
Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995) (discussing in rem civil forfeiture); United
States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 80-81 (1993) (ThomasJ, concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (determining that seizure of property at issue is prerequisite to
initiation of in rem civil forfeiture proceeding); ef. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622
(1993) (determining Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause applies to in rem civil forfeiture
proceedings).
24. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil
Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 5 n.28 (1994); see also Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993) (determining that in personam criminal forfeiture
constitutes fine for Eighth Amendment purposes).
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mandated in criminal forfeitures.' Because civil forfeiture actions
treat the property owner as a bystander, the government can proceed
directly against the offending property.26  As a result, the govern-
ment need not prove the culpability of the owner.27  In effect, this
imposes strict liability on owners whose property is used illegally,
regardless of who used the property or whether anyone was charged
with an offense.
28
Indeed, in civil forfeiture actions, the government only need
establish probable cause that the property either facilitated a drug
transaction or constitutes proceeds thereof.29 The burden then
shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property was not used illegally."0 In contrast, criminal
25. See DeborahJ. Challenger, Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due
Process-Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Owners: Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 64 TENN.
L. REV. 195, 197 (1996) (discussing lack of constitutional protections in in rein proceedings).
26. See Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581 (noting in rem proceedings are against property); see
also Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?,
62 FORDHAMi L. REv. 287, 291-93 (1993) (stating that theory behind civil forfeitures is that
property is guilty of crime committed).
27. See William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Forfeiture Statutes: Analysis and
Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1087, 1097 (1994).
28. See id. (asserting that effect of no culpability requirement is strict liability).
29. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992) (stating that
government has power to confiscate property in civil forfeiture actions upon showing of
probable cause); United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 91 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that probable cause must exist before government institutes civil forfeiture
action and that court will not consider post-filing evidence of probable cause); United States v.
One Parcel of Real Property, 85 F.3d 985, 988 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that probable cause allows
for in rem seizure of property); United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property, 92 F.3d 1123, 1126
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that government has burden to demonstrate probable cause that seized
property was substantially connected to drug dealing); United States v. 9844 South Titan Court,
75 F.3d 1470, 1477 (10th Cir. 1996) ("In a § 881 forfeiture proceeding, the government bears
the initial burden of showing probable cause that the property to be forfeited was used
illegally."); Williams v. United States, No. 95-228,1996 WL 117011, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 1996)
(unpublished order) (stating that government must demonstrate probable cause to believe
property is traceable to drug proceeds); United States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976, 979
(11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that government first must establish probable cause when seeking
forfeiture under § 881).
30. See Republic Nat'l Bank, 506 U.S. at 87 (stating that burden shifts to claimants after
government has established probable cause); United States v. All Right, Title & Interest In Real
Property & Appurtenances, 77 F.3d 648, 657 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that once government
establishes probable cause, the burden shifts to claimant); 9844 South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at
1477 (explaining that burden shifts to claimants once government establishes probable cause).
Under § 881, an owner also may file a claim alleging that he did not know about the
property's illegal use. This commonly is known as the "innocent owner" exception and is
codified in many forfeiture statutes. See eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-36K (1995) (codifying
innocent owner defense to forfeiture of automobile used in patronizing prostitute); FIA. STAT.
ch. 932.704 (1996) (discussing policy of Florida to protect proprietary interests of innocent
owners in forfeiture proceedings); Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.617 (stating that "[t]he rights of an
innocent owner are superior to any right or claim of the state or county"); see also One Parcel of
Real Property, 85 F.3d at 988 (establishing "innocent owner" as affirmative defense to
preponderance standard); Two Parcels of Real Property, 92 F.3d at 1129 (emphasizing that
claimant, not government, has burden of demonstrating innocent ownership). "Innocent
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forfeitures require the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the property was used illegally in the underlying of-
fense." Generally, property may not be forfeited in criminal
forfeitures until the defendant is convicted of the underlying
cne32crime.
s
Understandably, prosecutors prefer civil rather than criminal
forfeiture due to the procedural advantages." The lower burden of
proof and lack of a culpability requirement have made civil forfeiture
pursuant to § 881 a powerful law enforcement weapon in the war
against drugs. 4  Accordingly, the government commonly institutes
civil forfeiture proceedings against a defendant's property in addition
to the criminal trial of the defendant for the underlying drug
charges.35 Such parallel civil and criminal proceedings are an
extremely effective method of depriving drug offenders of the
economic benefits of their crimes.3 6 These separate proceedings,
however, raise the question of whether parallel proceedings violate
owners" are persons who entrust their property to another who, unbeknownst to the owner, uses
the property illegally. See id. In Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), the Supreme Court
held that although a Michigan forfeiture statute contained no innocent owner exception, it did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 1001. Writing for the majority, Chief'Justice Rehnquist determined
that a culpability requirement was unnecessary for civil forfeiture statutes. See id. at 1000-01.
The Court held that innocent owners could be held strictly liable for the uses made of their
property. See id. at 998.
31. See United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that proof that
property was used illegally must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
forfeiture action); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1994) (articulating that
in criminal forfeiture proceeding government must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
property was involved in criminal activity); United States v. Elgersma, 929 F.2d 1538, 1548 (1lth
Cir. 1991) (concluding that "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is proper in criminal
forfeiture proceeding); Cheh, supra note 24, at 5 n.28 (reasoning that defendants in criminal
forfeiture cases are afforded all rights recognized in criminal cases).
32. See David Osgood, Comment, Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture,
Double Jeopardy, and the War on Drugs, 71 WASH. L. REv. 489, 490 (1996) (explaining that in
criminal forfeitures, authorities first must prove defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
33. See Meredith S. Katz, Comment, Attorney-General of the State of New York v. One
Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler: Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 12 TouRO L. REv. 715, 719-
720 (1996) ("In recent history, civil forfeiture has been most commonly used as a device to
combat the trafficking of illegal drugs.").
34. SeeJuddJ. Balmer, Note, CivilFoifeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and the Eighth Amendment's
Excesive Fines Clause, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 999, 999-1000 (1996) ("A potent weapon in the judicial
arsenal, civil forfeiture has emerged as a favored method for imposing significant economic
sanctions against narcotics traffickers and for crippling drug-trading enterprises.").
35. See Stephen H. McClain, Note, Running the Gauntlet: An Assessment of the DoubleJeopardy
Implications of Criminally Prosecuting Drug Offenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeiture of Related Assets
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6) and (7), 70 NOTREDAME L. REv. 941,94243 (1995) (stating that
government often initiates parallel civil forfeiture cases under § 881 after criminal conviction
in order to use conviction to support motion for summary judgment in civil proceeding).
36. See id. at 943 (describing § 881 as powerful tool to prosecute drug offenders).
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the Fifth Amendment's proscription against multiple punishments for
the same offense.
37
II. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees
that no person "shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."' The proscription against double
jeopardy is one of the oldest ideas in western civilization' and is
fundamental to our system ofjustice.4 The Supreme Court has held
that the Clause consists of the following three separate constitutional
protections for defendants: (1) protection against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction; (2) protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; and (3)
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense."
The Double Jeopardy Clause preserves the finality of judicial
decisions. 2 By barring successive prosecutions after a defendant's
acquittal or conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clause preserves a
defendant's expectation of finality 3 An unconstitutional addition
to a sentence would occur, for example, when a judge imposes a
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. Id.
39. SeeWitte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing fundamental protections provided by Double Jeopardy
Clause); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (articulating that Court always has
understood Double Jeopardy Clause as providing fundamental protections); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 151-52 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that protection against double
jeopardy dates back to Greek and Roman times).
40. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969) (determining that guarantee
against double jeopardy is "fundamental"). The Supreme Court has held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 794. Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which
held that states could deny constitutional rights to their citizens if the totality of the
circumstances did not deprive them of fundamental fairness. See id. at 328-29.
41. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
42. See Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 250 (1986) ("One of the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to promote finality."); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 137, 165 (1977) ("Where
successive prosecutions are at stake, the [DoubleJeopardy Clause] serves 'a constitutional policy
of finality for the defendant's benefit.'" (quoting United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)
(plurality opinion))); see also David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the
Doublejeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 587,589 (1993) (determining
that need for finality of verdicts is fundamental principle behind Double Jeopardy Clause).
1 43. SeeJones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 385 (1989); see also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33
(1978) (determining that primary purpose of double jeopardy guarantee is to preserve finality
ofjudgments); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (holding that public interest
in finality of judgments is so significant that even when acquittal was based on erroneous
foundation defendant may not be retried); Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (stating that DoubleJeopardy
Clause serves to promote finality of decisions); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion) ("The
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant 'twice in jeopardy' represents a
constitutional policy of finality.").
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fifteen year sentence under a statute permitting fifteen years to life,
has second thoughts after the convict serves the time, and subsequent-
ly hails the defendant back to court to impose ten more years." In
preserving the right to finality, the clause protects the basic principles
of our legal system, including the prevention of government oppres-
sion, the protection of innocent defendants from wrongful convic-
tions, and the elimination of unfairness in punishing an individual
twice for the same offense.'
Under modem criminal and civil law, it is not uncommon for
multiple charges to arise from the same act or series of acts.46
Accordingly, protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause depends
on whether the two offenses constitute the "same offense. 47
Determining whether multiple offenses constitute the same offense is
44. See Jones, 491 U.S. at 392 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474
U.S. 28, 30-31 (1985) (per curiam) (determining that government can appeal criminal sentence
in limited situations); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980) (holding that
government may appeal criminal sentence when authorized by statute because statute gives
notice that district court's sentence is not final); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977) (discussing limited situations in which government may appeal criminal
conviction).
45. SeeJennifer E. Dayok, Comment, Administrative Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial
Tool That Is Not in Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L REV. 1151, 1160 (1996). For more on the issue of the
prevention of government oppression, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 25.1(b) (2d ed. 1992) ("[Tlhe adverse consequences of ... governmental
oppression ... are checked in several different ways by a double jeopardy clause aimed at
preserving the 'finality' or 'integrity' of final judgments.").
46. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970) ("In more recent times, with the
advent of specificity in draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and
related statutory offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous
series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction."); Eric Loeb et al., CtiminalProcedure
Project, 83 GEO. L.J. 1037, 1051 (1995) (asserting that under complex modem criminal law, it
is possible to be charged with multiple crimes for the same act or series of acts).
47. See Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1245 (1996) (discussing criteria for
determining whether defendant was punished twice for "same offense" under Double Jeopardy
Clause); Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199,2204 (1995) (determining that DoubleJeopardy
Clause protects against "'attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense'
(quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))); Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 n.1 (1994) ("The DoubleJeopardy Clause protects against second
prosecution for same offense."); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789 (1994) (recognizing that
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or
conviction and against multiple punishments for same offense); Loeb et al., supra note 46, at
1051.
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important in multiple prosecutions for related acts,48 such as those
involved in parallel civil forfeitures and criminal proceedings.
To determine whether multiple prosecutions for a single act or
series of acts violate the constitutional protection against being
punished twice for the same offense, courts use the "statutory
elements" test set forth in Blockburger v. United States.49 Under the
"statutory elements" test, when the same act or transaction constitutes
a violation of two statutes, the test applied to determine if there are
two offenses is whether each offense requires proof of an element
that the other does not.5" If each statutory violation requires proof
of an element that the other does not, Blockburgeis test is satisfied,
and prosecution for both offenses is not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.5
48. See Loeb et al., supra note 46, at 1051. Compare United States v. Mintz, 16 F.3d 1101,
1106 (10th Cir. 1994) (barring successive prosecutions for Kansas and Florida drug conspiracies
because conspiracies were interdependent), and Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir.
1986) (barring successive prosecutions of shooting into occupied building and murder because
offenses constituted single act), with United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that multiple prosecutions for conspiracy involving bank transactions and conspiracy
to defraud United States were permissible because objects of two conspiracies differed), and
Henry v. McFaul, 791 F.2d 48, 51 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (allowing successive prosecutions
for reckless operation of motor vehicle and attempted murder because proof of different
statutory elements is required), and United States v. Coachman, 752 F.2d 685, 692 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (allowing successive prosecutions for two contempt charges because separate contempts
are punishable as separate offenses).
49. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 699-97 (1993)
(determining that double jeopardy bars imposing multiple punishments or successive
prosecution if the two offenses for which defendant is being tried or punished do not survive
Blockburger's test); United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 388 (1992) (recognizing that Blockburgds
test may bar subsequent prosecutions); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (applying
Blockburge?s test to determine whether subsequent prosecution was barred by DoubleJeopardy
Clause), ovedu/ed by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
50. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also Rutledge, 116 S. Ct
at 1243 (determining under Blockburger"whether each of the statutory provisions requires proof
of a fact which the other does not"); Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204 (holding, under Blockburgels test,
that indictment did not charge same offense to which petitioner previously had plead guilty);
Dixot, 509 U.S. at 2856 (examining whether each offense contained statutory element not
contained in other under Blockburger); Grady, 495 U.S. at 516 (1990) ("If application of [the
Blockburger] test reveals that the offenses have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser
included offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease, and the subsequent prosecution is
barred."); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (holding that Blochburger test is used to
determine whether two offenses constitute same offense).
51. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 338 (1981); lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). Although there may be a substantial overlap in the evidentiary
showings for the two offenses, Blockburgeds test still maybe satisfied. See id.; see also Feli, 503 U.S.
at 386 ("[M] ere overlap in proof between the prosecutions does not establish a doublejeopardy
violation."); A/bernaz, 450 U.S. at 338 (determining that substantial overlap in proof does not
violate double jeopardy). The Double Jeopardy Clause also protects against multiple
prosecutions of lesser included offenses. See Payne v. Virginia, 468 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1984) (per
curiam) (stating that double jeopardy bars prosecution of lesser included offenses); Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1980) (holding that defendants cannot be tried subsequently for
lesser included offense after conviction). A lesser included offense does not contain any
elements beyond those of the greater offense. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167 (finding that
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III. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The underlying protections afforded by the DoubleJeopardy Clause
serve as the background against which parallel criminal and civil
forfeiture proceedings must be analyzed. In United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms,52 the Supreme Court articulated what
appeared to be an inflexible rule that civil forfeitures do not
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes." The circuits
began to question this rule, however, in light of several subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Halper,54 the Court held
for the first time that a civil penalty could constitute punishment for
double jeopardy purposes." After Halper, the Court decided two
closely related cases, Austin v. United States" and Department of Revenue
v. Kurth Ranch. 7 In Austin, the Court held that civil forfeitures of
facilitating property pursuant to § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) were subject
to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause."8 In Kurth Ranch, the Court determined that a civil drug tax
constituted double jeopardy when imposed with a criminal prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 9 Determining whether parallel civil
forfeiture actions pursuant to § 881 constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes requires both close examination of the relation-
ships between these four cases and analysis of the Court's rationale in
each.
"joyriding" was lesser included offense within auto theft); Loeb et al., supra note 46, at 1054
(stating that lesser included offense is one that does not contain elements beyond greater
offense). In determining what constitutes a lesser included offense, courts analyze only the
statutory elements of the two offenses. See United States v. DeShaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th
Cir. 1992) (finding that RICO conspiracy offense is not a lesser included offense of narcotics
conspiracy offense); United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405,415-16 (8th Cir. 1991) (analyzing
statutory elements of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and assault resulting in death);
Loeb et al., supra note 46, at 1054 (stating that courts will look to statutory elements rather than
trial evidence to determine what is a lesser included offense).
52. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
53. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984).
54. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
55. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
56. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
57. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
58. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993) (holding that Excessive Fines
Clause of Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture).
59. SeeDepartment ofRevenuev. Kurth Ranch, 114S. Ct. 1937,1948 (1994) (characterizing
drug tax as punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
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A. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms:
The Two-Pronged Test
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,° the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a civil forfeiture action initiated
after a criminal acquittal violated the Double Jeopardy Clause."
Initially, a gun dealer was indicted, but later acquitted, of the criminal
offense of selling firearms without a license.62 Following his acquit-
tal, the government instituted a civil forfeiture action against the
firearms seized from his home.6 3 The gun dealer argued that double
jeopardy barred the subsequent forfeiture action.'
In a unanimous decision by ChiefJustice Burger, the Court framed
the issue as "whether a ... forfeiture proceeding is intended to be,
or by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and
remedial."" The Court determined that Congress had intended the
forfeiture statute at issue to be a remedial, civil sanction rather than
a criminal punishment.66 In determining whether a forfeiture
proceeding is criminal or civil, the Court in 89 Firearms relied on the
test set forth in United States v. Ward, stating:
"Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on two
levels. First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second,
where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil
penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that inten-
tion.
"67
60. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
61. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984).
62. See id. at 355-56.
63. See id. at 356 (stating that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1968), the government
instituted forfeiture action to seize firearms).
64. See id. at 362.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 363-64; United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (stating that
whether penalty is civil or criminal is matter of statutory construction).
, 67. 89Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (1980)) (citations ommitted).
The Court in 89 Firearms determined that, because Congress had created such distinctly civil
procedures for the forfeitures, it had indicated that it intended a civil and not criminal sanction.
See id. at 363. The Court also determined that the statute furthered broad remedial aims
because its purpose was to keep dangerous firearms out of the hands of unlicensed dealers. See
id. at 364.
Contrary to the statute at issue in 89Firearms, the forfeiture statute at issue in Ursey does not
have "distinctly civil procedures." More notably present in § 881 is the "innocent owner"
defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4), (a)(6), and (a)(7) (1994). The Court in Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1911), held that "these [innocent owner defenses] serve to focus the
provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them look more like punishment,
1997] 1219
THE AmERCAN UNwERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1207
The Court noted that "'only the clearest proof that the purpose and
effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress'
manifest preference for a civil sanction."I Because the Court
concluded that double jeopardy does not bar a civil, remedial
forfeiture proceeding following an acquittal on related criminal
charges,69 the subsequent forfeiture proceeding against the firearms
was permissible.
70
With its holding in 89Firearms, the Court appeared to have settled
the question whether civil forfeitures constituted punishment under
the DoubleJeopardy Clause. In 1989, however, the Court determined
that civil penalties could be considered punishment for double
jeopardy purposes in United States v. Halper.
71
B. United States v. Halper: The Solely Remedial Test
In Halper, the Supreme Court considered whether a civil penalty
that bore "no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
government for its loss"72 constituted double jeopardy.'3 Halper,
who managed a medical service provider, submitted inflated claims for
reimbursement to an insurance company.7 4 As a result, the insur-
ance company overpaid the medical service provider, resulting in a
$585 loss to the government.75 Halper was convicted on sixty-five
counts of violating the criminal false claims statute and sixteen counts
of mail fraud for submitting inflated insurance claims.7 6 As a result,
Halper was sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $5000.77
The government then brought suit against Halper under the civil
False Claims Act, seeking to recover $130,000 ($2000 per false
claim).'7 The district court refused to impose the penalty, however,
stating that it bore no "rational relation" to the government's actual
not less." Id. at 619.
68. 89 Frearms, 465 U.S. at 365 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
69. See id at 366. The Court was careful to limit its holding to the particular forfeiture
statute at issue and not to make general conclusions. The Court stated: "We hold that a gun
owner's acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rein
forfeiture proceeding against those firearms under § 924(d)." Id.
70. See id.
71. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
72. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
73. See id. at 436.




78. See id. at 438.
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loss or to the cost of legal fees and investigations of the respondent's
false claims.79
On direct appeal from the district court, the Supreme Court
rejected the prosecution's argument that double jeopardy could not
apply in a civil case."0 The Court held that under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, an individual who already has been punished in a
criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction for the same conduct if the civil sanction is punitive, and not
remedial, in nature. In other words, when analyzing parallel criminal
and civil sanctions, if the civil sanction is punitive in nature, it violates
the DoubleJeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments
for the same offense.8" The Court stated that "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."82
The Supreme Court's decision in Halper opened the door for
defendants in civil cases to make double jeopardy challenges
previously thought impossible as a result of the Court's holding in 89
Firearms. Four years later, the Court applied Halpe's "solely remedial"
test in Austin v. United StateP8 when examining civil forfeiture in the
context of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 4
C. Austin v. United States:
The Eighth Amendment and Civil Forfeitures
In Austin, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a civil
forfeiture constituted punishment, but this time in the context of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment." The defendant
in Austin plead guilty to one count of violating drug laws and was
sentenced to seven years imprisonment.86 Subsequently, the govern-
79. SeeUnited States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531,533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated and remande,
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
80. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42.
81. See id. at 447-49. When determining if a particular civil sanction is characterized as
remedial or punitive, the Court stated that the purposes served by the sanction at issue must be
examined, not the label affixed to it. See id. at 447-48. The Court stated: "'[T~he labels affixed
either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed... are not controlling and will not be allowed
to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional law.'" Id. at 448 (quoting Hicks v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988)).
82. Id. In Ursey, the Court asserted that this statement was merely dictum and that it did
not set forth a rule. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2145 n.2 (1996). Justice
Stevens, however, maintained that this was the narrower rule set forth by Halper. See id. at 2157
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
84. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993).
85. See id. at 602.
86. See id. at 604.
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ment instituted a civil forfeiture action pursuant to § 881 (a) (7)
against the individual's mobile home and auto body shop, asserting
that they were facilitating property.17 The defendant argued that the
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's protection against
excessive fines.'
Contrary to six of the seven circuit courts that had ruled on the
issue, 9 the Supreme Court held that forfeiture of facilitating
property pursuant to § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) was subject to the
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,"
despite the in rem nature of such actions.9 The Court analyzed the
historical purposes behind in rem forfeitures, concluding that they
"have been understood, at least in part, as punishment."" The
Court expressly relied on the analysis set forth in Halper, concluding
that the forfeitures of facilitating property under § 881 (a) (4) and
(a) (7) did not serve an entirely remedial purpose and therefore
constituted punishment subject to limitation under the Eighth
Amendment.9" The Court in Austin, however, ruled only on the
nature of forfeiture with respect to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
87. See id.
88. See id. at 605 & n.2.
89. Prior to Austin, six of seven federal circuit courts that considered the issue held that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil forfeitures. Comnpare
United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d 200, 206-07 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding proportionality
analysis under Eighth Amendment unnecessary in civil forfeiture cases brought pursuant to
§ 881(a) (7)), and United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Eighth
Amendment does not apply to civil in rem actions .... ." (citing United States v. OnLeong
Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1990))), and United States v. 3097
S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991) (determining that Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis does not apply to civil forfeiture cases), and United States v. 107.9 Acre
Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that § 881(a) (7) does not
violate Eighth Amendment), and United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989)
(declining to extend Eighth Amendment protections to § 881 (a) (7)), and United States v. Tax
Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 233-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply Eighth Amendment to civil
forfeiture actions), with United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that Eighth Amendment analysis did not apply).
90. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
91. See id. at 615 ("The fiction 'that the thing is primarily considered the offender' has a
venerable history in our case law." (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921))). The Court refused to rely on the in rem nature of the proceeding in Austin. See
id at 616 n.9. The Court stated: "We do not understand the Government to rely separately on
the technical distinction between proceedings in rem and proceedings in personar, but we note
that any such reliance would be misplaced." Id.
92. 1d; at 618; se aso Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974)
(noting punitive and deterrent purposes served by forfeiture statutes).
93. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621. In its decision, the Court relied heavily on the innocent
owner provision of the Act, which focused on the culpability of the owner in a way that made
it look more like punishment. See id. The Court also recognized that under § 881(a) (4) and
(a) (7), the forfeiture was tied directly to the commission of a drug offense. See id. Finally, the
Court examined the legislative history of the statute in which Congress had recognized that the
traditional aim of forfeiture was to punish. See id. at 622 n.14.
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Fines Clause,94 leaving open the question of whether forfeiture was
subject to the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
D. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch:
Tax Statutes and Double Jeopardy
In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,95 the Court departed from
Halpeis "solely remedial" test when faced with a double jeopardy
challenge to a Montana drug tax imposed after the conviction of
several individuals.96 In Kurth Ranch, six members of a family were
convicted of cultivating and selling marijuana. 7 The state revenue
department attempted to collect $900,000 in taxes on the possession
of marijuana pursuant to Montana's Drug Tax Act.98 The defen-
dants claimed that the tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.99
A divided Supreme Court held that the drug tax imposed on
convicted drug dealers was punitive for double jeopardy purposes.1°°
In its analysis, the Court determined that Halpeis test for punishment
could not be applied due to the differing objectives of tax statutes
and civil penalties.' The Court noted that tax statutes usually
serve the nonpunitive purpose of raising revenue, whereas civil
penalties typically serve punitive purposes.0 2 Although the Court
did not apply Halper's test for punishment, it relied on the definition
of punishment enunciated in Halper, stating that the drug tax
constituted "a second punishment within the contemplation of a
constitutional protection that has 'deep roots in our history and
jurisprudence,' and therefore must be imposed during the first
prosecution or not at all."' Based on the high tax assessment in
proportion to the drugs' market value, the tax's deterrent effect, the
fact that imposition of the tax was contingent on the commission of
a crime, and the fact that the state sought to levy the tax on property
that never was owned legally because the drugs constituted contra-
band, the Court concluded that the tax was punitive and thus barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.'
94. See id at 622.
95. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
96. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (1994).
97. See id. at 1942.
98. See id.; see also Dangerous Drug Tax Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987)
(repealed 1995) (taxing those who profit from drug-related offenses).
99. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943.
100. See id. at 1948.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1946.
103. Id at 1948 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)).
104. See id. at 1946-47.
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IV. THE ROAD TO UN1TED STATES V. URSEREY'
THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
In light of the Court's findings in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch,
the circuits' application of the law regarding parallel criminal and civil
proceedings pursuant to § 881 was unpredictable. A pair of cases
from the Ninth and Sixth Circuits presented the Supreme Court with
the opportuniity to resolve the split. In United States v.
$405,089.23,l°5 the Ninth Circuit determined that civil forfeiture of
proceeds pursuant to § 881 (a) (6) constituted punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. 0 6 In United States v. Ursery,'0 7 the Sixth Circuit
held that civil forfeiture of facilitating property pursuant to
§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) constituted punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. 08 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for both cases
which then were consolidated. ° 9
A. The Ninth Circuit Decision in United States v. $405,089.23:
Forfeiture of Proceeds is Punishment
In $405,089.23, the government tried Charles Arlt andJames Wren
for conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphet-
amine.' The district court convicted both Arlt and Wren of the
underlying criminal offenses."' Five days after the criminal indict-
ments, the government filed an in rem complaint against a bank
account, helicopter, shrimp boat, airplane, and numerous automo-
biles."2 The government alleged that these properties were con-
nected to the offenses charged in the parallel criminal cases and
therefore were forfeitable as proceeds of illegal narcotics transactions
under § 881 (a) (6)."3 All parties agreed to defer the forfeiture
105. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. See United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994), opinim amended on
denial ofreh'g by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
107. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
108. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
109. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
110. See $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1214.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. The government also argued that the property was forfeitable as property
"involved in" money laundering violations under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(A). See id. The district
court concluded that probable cause was established with regard to both the narcotics
transactions and money laundering, and that the property therefore was forfeitable pursuant to
either statute. See id at 1215.
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litigation for the duration of the criminal prosecution. 14  Subse-
quent to Arlt's and Wren's criminal convictions, however, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States,
finding that all of the assets were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of
illegal narcotics activity. 5 Arlt and Wren appealed, contending that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the civil forfeiture action because
they already had been prosecuted for criminal violations arising from
the same acts.116
Guided primarily by Austin and Halper, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the subsequent civil forfeiture
pursuant to § 881 (a) (6).n7 The court first determined that the civil
and criminal trials, although roughly contemporaneous, constituted
"separate proceedings" for double jeopardy purposes. 1 8  Although
acknowledging that two other circuits had reached the opposite
conclusion," 9 the Court found that a "forfeiture case and a criminal
prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only if they were
brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time."
120
Applying Halper, the Ninth Circuit held that forfeiture of proceeds
pursuant to § 881 (a) (6) constituted punishment for doublejeopardy
purposes.' Although the court recognized that under the Su-
preme Court's analysis in 89Firearms civil forfeitures did not constitute
punishment in the double jeopardy context, it concluded that in
Halper the Supreme Court had abandoned the two-prong analysis of
89 Firearms and essentially had "changed its collective mind.' 2 2 The
114. See id. at 1214.
115. See id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the government when the
defendants failed to introduce any evidence demonstrating that the property was not subject to
forfeiture. See id.
116. See id. at 1215. Appellants also claimed "that the government lacked probable cause to
institute [the] proceedings.... that the forfeiture vioate[d] the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, and that the district court lacked in remjurisdiction over a small part of
the res." Id.
117. See id. at 1222.
118. See id. at 1216.
119. See id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Second and Eleventh Circuits recently had
held that parallel criminal prosecutions and civil forfeitures constituted the same proceeding for
double jeopardy purposes. See id. In United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493
(11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit determined that, because the forfeiture action and
criminal prosecution took place at approximately the same time and involved the same criminal
violations, they were part of a "single, coordinated prosecution." Id. at 1499. Similarly, in United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit found "that the civil and criminal
actions were but different prongs of a single prosecution of the [respondents] by the
government." Id. at 20. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded "that the position adopted by
the Second and Eleventh Circuits contradicts controlling Supreme Court precedent as well as
common sense." $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1216.
120. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1216 (emphasis added).
121. See id. at 1218-19.
122. Id. at 1218.
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court further held that in Austin the Supreme Court specifically had
applied Halpets solely remedial test to determine whether forfeiture
under §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) constituted punishment.123 Because
Austin had concluded that forfeiture of facilitating property constitut-
ed punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, the Ninth
Circuit held that it constituted punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause as well.
124
B. The Sixth Circuit Decision in United States v. Ursery:
Forfeiture of Facilitating Property is Punishment
The Sixth Circuit employed a similar analysis in United States v.
Ursery' when examining civil forfeiture of facilitating property
pursuant to § 881. In Ursery, police officers executing a search
warrant found evidence that Guy Ursery was growing, processing, and
consuming marijuana at or near his home. 26 Initially, the govern-
ment brought a civil forfeiture action against Ursery's home as
facilitating property pursuant to § 881 (a) (7),127 which resulted in
the entry of a consent judgment for $13,250.128 Ursery later was
criminally indicted and charged with one count of manufacturing
marijuana. 12  The district court convicted and sentenced Ursery to
sixty-three months imprisonment and four years of supervised
release."s Ursery appealed the district court's decision, arguing that
his criminal prosecution and punishment subsequent to the civil
forfeiture proceeding violated the DoubleJeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'
3'
In reversing Ursery's conviction, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
forfeiture of facilitating property pursuant to § 881 (a) (7) constituted
punishment subject to the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause. 2 Relying on Halper and Austin, the court held that "any
civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) constitutes punishment
123. See id. at 1220.
124. See id. at 1219. The Ninth Circuit concluded that"ifa forfeiture constitutes punishment
under the Halper criteria, it constitutes 'punishment' for purposes of both clauses." I& (footnote
omitted).
125. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).







132. See id. at 573. The Sixth Circuit first determined thatjeopardy had attached in the civil
forfeiture proceeding because the consentjudgment was analogous to a guilty plea entered in
a criminal case, which constitutes jeopardy. See id. at 571.
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for double jeopardy purposes." 3 The court further determined
that Ursery's criminal conviction and the civil forfeiture of his
property constituted punishment for the same offense." Applying
the "statutory elements" test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Blockburger v. United States,"' , the court found that the criminal
offense did not require any elements of proof beyond those required
by the civil forfeiture action.136  Because the two constituted the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes, the subsequent civil
forfeiture action was barred. Although the court recognized that the
government can impose multiple punishments for the same offense
if done within a single proceeding,13 7 it declined to hold that the
parallel civil and criminal actions at issue constituted a single,
coordinated proceeding for double jeopardy purposes.'8
V. UNITED STATES V. URSERY: THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
AND RATIONALE
Led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority in United States v.
Ursely 3 9 relied on "a long line of cases ... consistently concluding
133. Id at 573.
134. See id. at 573-74.
135. See 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("The applicable rule is that, where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not.").
136. See Ursery, 59 F.3d at 574-75.
137. See id. at 574 (relying on United States v. Haper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989)).
138. The Sixth Circuit did not adopt the rationale set forth by any of the other circuits that
had ruled on the issue of when parallel civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings can constitute
a "single, coordinated proceeding." See id. at 575. The court stated that "the existence of a
'single, coordinated proceeding' could arguably satisfy the requirements of the DoubleJeopardy
Clause, as suggested by the Second and Eleventh Circuits, [but] the facts in this case fail to
reveal such a single, coordinated proceeding." Id. The court noted that both proceedings were
presided over by different judges, decided by separate judgments, and instituted four months
apart. See id. The court also recognized that there was no communication between the
government lawyers assigned to the civil and criminal actions. See id. Additionally, the court did
not adopt the Ninth Circuit's belief-as set forth in United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210,
1216 (9th Cir. 1994)-that parallel criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings always will violate
doublejeopardy. Seeid. Its decision suggested the permissibility of concurrent criminal and civil
forfeiture actions in limited situations.
In an extremely critical dissentJudge Milburn rejected the majority's rationale, arguing that
the issue of whether parallel civil and criminal actions constitute a "single proceeding" for
double jeopardy purposes should turn on the timing of the proceedings and the potential for
government abuse. See id. at 577 (Milburn, J., dissenting). Judge Milbur criticized the
majority's approach as "unpredictable," arguing that his approach "avoids the inevitable difficulty
of a case-by-case comparison of the level of coordination" between the civil and criminal actions.
Id. at 577-78 (Milburn, J., dissenting). He concluded that because the "government was not
acting.., out of dissatisfaction with the first outcome" and because the actions were maintained
during the same time frame, the actions constituted a single proceeding that did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 578 (Milburn,J., dissenting).
139. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
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that the [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not apply to [civil forfeiture]
actions because they do not impose punishment."14 Although the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits found that Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch
created a new test for determining whether a civil sanction constitutes
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause,141 the Supreme
Court held that the circuits had misread those decisions.14 2  The
Court stated that Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch could not be applied
in Ursery because none of them concerned the issue in Ursery:
whether in rem civil forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 1" Instead, the majority considered the forfeitures under the
rationales set forth in Various Items of Personal Property v. United
States,'" One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,"4  and United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,4' each of which concluded
that civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.147
Using the two-prong analysis set forth in 89 Firearms,48 the
majority in Ursery determined that the civil forfeiture of facilitating
property and proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (A) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (6) and (a) (7) did not constitute punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.149 Under the first prong, the majority
examined whether Congress intended the proceedings to be civil or
criminal, concluding that Congress had intended the forfeiture of
140. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996).
141. See id. at 2142-43.
142. See id. at 2147.
143. See id.
144. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
145. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
146. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
147. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140-42 (relying on Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89
Firearms). In Various Items, the Court determined that the civil forfeiture of a distilling plant used
to produce illegal alcohol during the Prohibition Era did not constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. SeeVarious Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577,580-81
(1931). The Court determined that because the proceedingwas in rem against property, it could
not constitute punishment. See id. at 581. Similarly, in Emerald Cut Stones, the Court determined
that the civil forfeiture of smuggled jewels did not constitute punishment due to the remedial
purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1497. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235-36 (1972). The Court held in 89Firearms that civil forfeiture of firearms did not constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes because the cause of action arose from the Gun
Control Act, and Congress intended the cause of action to be remedial, not punitive. See United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984).
148. The first part of the analysis requires the Court to determine whether Congress
intended the forfeiture statute to be civil or criminal. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63. The
second part of the analysis requires the Court to determine "'[w]hether the statutory scheme
[is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate' Congress' intention to establish a civil
remedial mechanism." Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980));
see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing two-prong test in 89 Firearms).
149. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-49.
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both facilitating property and proceeds to be civil in nature.150
Applying the second prong of the 89 Firearms test, the majority
examined the statute for the "clearest proof' that it was so punitive in
purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intent.15' The Court found
little evidence that forfeiture of proceeds and facilitating property
pursuant to § 881 was "so punitive in form and effect as to render
them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary."
152
The majority also relied heavily on the classification by Various Items
of civil forfeitures as in rem proceedings against property,53 contrast-
ing these types of proceedings with in personam proceedings against
the individual.154 The majority reasoned that in rem civil forfeitures
could not be punitive because they are proceedings against property
and not the individual.'55 The Court concluded that the civil
forfeiture of both proceeds and facilitating property under § 881 was
not punitive for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause.' 56
In his dissent in Ursery, Justice Stevens suggested that 89 Firearms
and Emerald Cut Stones were not incompatible with Halper, Austin, and
Kurth Ranch; rather, 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones "set the stage
for the modem understanding of how the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies in nominally civil proceedings."' 7 Justice Stevens argued
that Halpe'?s solely remedial test for punishment should have been
applied to civil forfeitures brought pursuant to § 881.15 Although
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's judgment that the
forfeiture of proceeds was not punitive,'59 he stated that with regard
to the forfeiture of facilitating property, "[f]idelity to both reason and
precedent dictates the conclusion that this forfeiture was 'punishment'
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."
16°
150. See id. at 2147-48.
151. See id. at 2148.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 2140; Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581
(1931) (determining that civil forfeiture proceeding was not punishment because it was in rem
proceeding against property).
154. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141 (relying on Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581).
155. See id. at 2140-41, 2149.
156. See id. at 2149.
157. Id. at 2155 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. See id. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
159. See id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. I. at 2161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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VI. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. URSERY
Although Ursery allows for the continued use of civil forfeitures in
the government's war against drugs, the Court's rationale was
inconsistent with applicable precedent. The majority failed to
recognize and apply the general rule set forth in Haler: that a civil
sanction must serve a solely remedial purpose in order to avoid
invoking the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.'6 ' In so
doing, the Court accorded too much import to the "pedantic"
distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings.12  Rather,
the Court should have acknowledged that Halpers "solely remedial"
test refined the two-prong analysis of 89 Firearms. The Court's
decision severely weakened the Fifth Amendment proscription against
double jeopardy.
A. The Court Should Have Applied Halper
The majority in Ursery refused to adopt the analysis employed by the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The Court attempted to distinguish its prior
decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, declaring those cases
inapplicable."6 According to the majority in Ursery, none of those
decisions discarded the Court's traditional understanding that civil
forfeitures do not constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause."6 Instead, the Court looked to 89 Firearms, Emerald Cut
Stones, and Various Items as controlling precedent.6' The majority's
analysis, however, is incomplete.
1. Harmonizing 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones with Halper
Contrary to the majority's assertion in Ursery, Emerald Cut Stones and
89 Firearms never endorsed a traditional understanding that civil
forfeiture could not be punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In fact, the Court in Emerald Cut Stones used an analysis similar to that
161. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
162. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct at 2160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings is pretext for Court's
real basis of decision).
163. The Court limited Halper to the issue of whether a civil penalty could constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See id. at 2143. Similarly, Austin applied only to civil
forfeitures in the context of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. See id. at 2143-44.
Finally, the Court narrowly construed Kurth Ranch to apply only to tax statutes that are so
punitive that they constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id,
at 2144.
164. See id. at 2147.
165. See id.
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in Halperr'6 The Court in Emerald Cut Stones analyzed the purposes
of the forfeiture statute at issue, 19 U.S.C. § 1497, in deciding
whether Congress intended it to be remedial or punitive in na-
ture. 67 Only after an examination of the character of the particular
forfeiture statute at issue did the Court in Emerald Cut Stones conclude
that it was remedial and did not constitute punishment."u Thus,
the Court's holding in Emerald Cut Stones announced no broad rule
that civil forfeitures could not be considered punitive in the double
jeopardy context.
Similarly, the Court's decision in 89 Firearms is not inconsistent with
Halper. The Court in 89 Firearms examined the "broad remedial aims"
of the gun control forfeiture statute at issue 69 and determined that
keeping firearms away from unlicensed dealers was a remedial
goal. 7  Thus, the statute was not punitive.' The Court conclud-
ed that the forfeiture statute was a remedial sanction and therefore
was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 This analysis
bears a strong resemblance to the Halper test, which requires a solely
remedial purpose. Because the similarities between the analyses of
Halper, 89 Firearms, and Emerald Cut Stones indicate a closer relation-
166. In Emerald Cut Stones, after being tried and acquitted of smuggling jewels into the
United States, the owner of the jewels intervened in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding against
thejewels. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,232-33 (1972). The
district court held that the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy barred the
subsequent forfeiture proceedings. See id. at 233.
In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture proceeding was not barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause because it "involve[d] neither two criminal trials nor two criminal
punishments." Id. at 235. In making its decision, the Court carefully examined the character
of the forfeiture statute at issue, 19 U.S.C. § 1497. See id. at 236-37. It found that the forfeiture
provided a reasonable form of liquidated damages to reimburse the government for expenses
incurred as a result of investigation and enforcement. See id. at 237. The Court further
recognized that the purposes behind the statute were remedial, not punitive. See id. Finally, the
Court determined that the penalties imposed were not"so unreasonable or excessive that [they]
transform[ed] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Id.
For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Halper, see supra notes 72-84 and accompanying
text.
167. See Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237 (analyzing character of forfeiture statute in
double jeopardy context).
168. See id.
169. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) (1976).
170. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984). In 89
Firearms, the Court determined that "Congress sought to 'control the indiscriminate flow' of
firearms and to 'assist and encourage States and local communities to adopt and enforce stricter
gun control laws.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 8 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.CA-N. 4410, 4425).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 366.
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ship than the majority acknowledged, 173 the Court should have
included Halper in its "long line of cases."174
The Court's omission of Halper from its "long line of cases" was
likely due to the policy implications involved. If the Court had held
that the civil forfeiture of proceeds or facilitating property was
punitive for double jeopardy purposes, it would have eliminated an
extremely useful tool in the nation's war against drugs. This would
have been a major setback to law enforcement agencies at all levels
of government. The majority had to distinguish Halper to avoid
applying its "solely remedial" test because the forfeiture of facilitating
property under § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) likely would not have passed
constitutional muster under that analysis.
2. The Court's narrow construction of Halper
The majority in Ursery determined that the analysis in Halper was
only appropriate for the "rare case" involving civil penalties such as
fines. 75 Although the majority classified civil penalties as a form of
liquidated damages compensating the government for harm caused
by a defendant, 7 it determined that civil forfeitures "are designed
primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to
require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct."'77 Due to
173. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-49 (1989) (examining purposes and
character of penalty to determine whether civil sanction constitutes punishment); 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. at 363-64 (examining purpose and character of 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) in determining
whether it was punitive); Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236 (assessing character of forfeiture
statute in order to determine whether it was remedial or punitive in nature).
Furthermore, the majority misconstrued Austin to bolster its position in Ursery. It claimed that
Austin endorsed its traditional understanding that civil forfeiture is not punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2146 (1996) ("In Austin we
expressly recognized and approved our decisions in OneLot Emerald Cut Stones v. United Statesand
United States v. One Assortment of Firearms") (citations omitted). The majority's "traditional
understanding," however, never was endorsed in Austin. As pointed out by Justice Stevens'
dissent, the majority "creates the appearance" that Austin endorsed its interpretation of 89
Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones by quoting selectively from its holding. See id. at 2154 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Austin actually held that "[t]he DoubleJeopardy
Clause has been held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only in cases where the
forfeiture could properly be characterized as remediaL" Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4
(1993) (emphasis added). Thus, under the rationale in Austin, the Double Jeopardy Clause
could apply to civil forfeiture statutes when the statute is not characterized as remedial. See id.
This contradicts the majority's assertion in Ursey that the Court in Austin "expressly recognized
and approved" Emerald Cut Stones and 89 Firearms.
174. Urseqy, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
175. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50).
176. See id. at 2144-45.
177. Id. at 2145.
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these different objectives, the Court concluded that Halper could not
be applied in the civil forfeiture context.178
The Court's limitation of the analysis in Halper to civil penalties,
however, was inappropriate. The majority misconstrued the Court's
holding in Halper, merging the two rules it set forth. 79 Both the
majority and Justice Stevens, in his dissent, agreed that Halper set
forth a narrow rule for rare cases involving disproportionate civil
penalties. 8 ' The majority, however, explicitly rejected the notion
that Halper also set forth a general rule.
18 1
As argued by justice Stevens, Halper established a general rule that
"'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term.'" 82 Although the majority in Ursery attempted
to dismiss Halpeis general rule as mere dictum, it did nothing to
refute the fact that the Court in Austin expressly relied on this general
rule."ta As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, "Austin expressly
quoted Halper and followed its general rule that a sanction should be
characterized as 'punishment' if it serves any punitive end."1s4  It
seems unlikely that the Court in Austin would have relied on what the
majority in Ursery refers to as dictum. Contrary to the majority's
opinion, the general rule set forth in Halper did exist, at least as far
as the Court in Austin was concerned18a
178. See id. The majority determined that it was not possible to quantify the nonpunitive
purposes of a particular civil forfeiture. See id, It further found that it was too difficult to
determine whether a particular forfeiture bears a rational relationship to its nonpunitive
purposes. See id Because Halpers analysis requires courts to compare the harm suffered by the
government to the size of the penalty imposed on the individual, the majority concluded that
it could not be applied. See id.
179. For a discussion of Halper, see supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
180. The majority limited Halper by holding that it applied only in "the context of civil
penalties." Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144. In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed that Halperset forth
a narrow rule for rare cases involving disproportionate civil penalties. See id. at 2157 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181. See id. at 2145 n.2. "Nowhere in Halper does the Court set forth two distinct rules or
purport to apply a two-step analysis. Justice Stevens finds his 'general rule' in a dictum from
Halper...." Id.
182. Id. at 2156 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)).
183. See Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2145 n.2 (failing to give an explanation for the Court's reliance
in Austin on Halpd's general rule).
184. I. at 2157 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
185. The majority's reliance on Kurth Ranch to refute the application of Halpers analysis to
civil forfeitures similarly is misplaced. See id. at 2146 (noting that Court in Kurth Ranch
"expressly disclaimed reliance on Halpe'). The majority relied on the Court's determination
in Kurth Ranch that "because 'tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties ....
Halpd's method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not
work in the case of a tax statute.'" Id. (quoting Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
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Furthermore, this general rule is applicable to all "civil sanc-
tions,"186 which, as the Court held in Kurth Ranch, includes civil
forfeitures. In Halper, the Court "assess[ed] the character of the
actual sanctions imposed on the individual" in determining "whether
[the] particular civil sanction constitute[d] ... punishment."
87
Subsequently, in Kurth Ranch, the Court expressly stated that
"[criminal] fines, [civil] penalties, and [civil] forfeitures are readily
characterized as sanctions."" Thus, although the Court in Halper
examined the character of the sanctions, Kurth Ranch recognized that
civil forfeitures constitute sanctions. Contrary to the majority's
opinion in Ursery, therefore, Kurth Ranch extended Halpeds analysis to
include civil forfeitures as well as civil penalties.
By refusing to acknowledge the general rule in Halper, the Court in
Ursery significantly lowered the threshold for characterizing civil
statutes as remedial for double jeopardy purposes. Under the Halper
test, which requires a solely remedial purpose, civil statutes are subject
to a more rigorous analysis of whether they are indeed remedial in
nature. Due to the majority's refusal to apply Halper, civil forfeiture
statutes can have punitive aspects and yet be classified as remedial
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.'89 In effect, because civil
-forfeiture statutes may be considered remedial while retaining
punitive aspects, the government may circumvent the constitutional
protections required in criminal proceedings. The lesser burden of
proof in civil proceedings effectively is imported into the criminal
realm.
B. The In Rem Fiction
In reaching its decision, the majority in Ursery relied heavily upon
the distinction the Court made in Various Items between in rem civil
Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994)). Although the majority pointed out that Kurth Ranch refused to apply
Halper's narrow rule regarding civil penalties, it failed to acknowledge the fact that Kurth Ranch
expressly relied on Halpers definition of "punishment." See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948
(applying Halpe/s definition of punishment). In Kurth Ranch, the Court applied Halpers
definition of punishment and held that the drug tax was "a second punishment within the
contemplation of a constitutional protection that has 'deep roots in our history and
jurisprudence."' Id. (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 440). Thus, although Halpers narrow rule
could not be applied in Kurth Ranch because that case involved a tax statute, Halper's definition
of punishment can be applied to more than just civil penalties.
186. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
187. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 & n.7 (emphasis added).
188. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994).
189. In Ursery, the Court even acknowledged that subsections (a) (6) and (a) (7) have "certain
punitive aspects." Ursesy, 116 S. Ct. at 2148. Despite these punitive aspects, the Court
determined that civil forfeitures pursuant to § 881 did not constitute punishment. See id. at
2149.
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forfeitures and in personam civil penalties."9 Because the majority
determined that civil forfeitures are in rem actions against property,
such proceedings could not be deemed punishment for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9' The Court, however, placed too
much importance on this distinction.
The difference between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil
penalties is merely a "pedantic distinction."192 In Austin,'93 the
Court made clear that it would give little weight to this distinction,
declaring that "[w] e do not understand the government to rely
separately on the technical distinction between proceedings in rem
and proceedings in personam, but we note that any such reliance
would be misplaced."" The primary purpose behind creation of
the in rem fiction was to expand judicial jurisdiction over property in
situations where the courts lacked in personam jurisdiction over
individuals, not to create immunity from double jeopardy review. 95
Thus, the majority in Ursery went too far in relying upon this
distinction to deny claimants double jeopardy protection.
Further, the Court in Austin expressly stated that "forfeiture
proceedings historically have been understood as imposing punish-
ment despite their in rem nature." 9 ' In Austin, the Court recog-
nized that the in rem fiction rested on the idea that the owner was
190. See Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2141 (determining that Various Items drew "sharp distinction
between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties").
Various Itemswas one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court considered civil forfeitures
in the context of double jeopardy. SeeVarious Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282
U.S. 577 (1931). In Various Items, a distilling company had been ordered to forfeit a distillery,
warehouse, and denaturing plant on the ground that the company had defrauded the
government of taxes, in violation of federal law. See id. at 578. The government admitted that,
prior to the forfeiture proceeding, the company had been charged and convicted on criminal
violations based on "the transactions set forth ... as a basis for the forfeiture." Id. at 579.
After considering the distilling company's argument that the subsequent civil forfeiture
proceeding violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court determined that double
jeopardy protection did not apply. See id. at 580-81. The Court held that the civil forfeiture was
an in rem proceeding to forfeit the property the company used in committing the crime. See id.
at 580. The Court further determined that in an in rem proceeding, "[i ] t is the property which
is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it
were conscious." Id at 581. Finally, the Court contrasted criminal prosecutions, in which the
person is proceeded against, from civil forfeitures, in which "[t]he forfeiture is no part of the
punishment for the criminal offense." Id.
191. See Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (holding that in rem civil forfeitures do not constitute
punishment under Double Jeopardy Clause).
192. See id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
194. Id at 616 n.9.
195. See Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 559 (1992) ("The
fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts and to
furnish remedies for aggrieved parties.").
196. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616 n.9.
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negligent in allowing his property to be involved in a crime. 197 The
Court explained that "'such misfortunes are in part owing to the
negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by
the forfeiture."'"" 8  The Court realized that despite the civil
forfeiture's in rem nature, the owner was being punished. Although
the Court in Austin recognized that the in rem proceedings at issue
were against the property and not the person, it refused to use this
distinction as a reason to deny the defendants constitutional
protections.1" If the Court in Austin refused to rely on the in rem
nature of the proceeding, the majority in Ursery should have done the
same.
The majority's reliance on the distinction between in rem and in
personam proceedings has, injustice Stevens' words, "cut deeply into
a guarantee deemed fundamental by the Founders."2" To under-
score his point Justice Stevens, in his dissent, compared the circum-
stances under which Various Items and 89 Firearms were decided with
those of Ursery.2° Various Items involved the forfeiture of a Prohibi-
tion era distillery that served no other purpose than to manufacture
illegal alcohol,202 and 89 Firearms involved the forfeiture of firearms
sold without a license."5 In contrast, Ursery involved a forfeiture
action against an individual's home that served as a family resi-
dence."° Justice Stevens asked what the Court's reaction would
have been if Congress had authorized the forfeiture of all homes
where alcohol was consumed in 1931.25 Under the Court's analysis
197. See id. at 615.
198. Id. at 618 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
In his concurrence in Ursery,Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the distinction between in rem
and in personam is a "fiction alive in Various Items but condemned in Austin." United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,2151 (1996) (citations omitted) (KennedyJ., concurring in judgment).
Justice Kennedy partially agreed withJustice Stevens' dissent, stating that "[i]t is the (property]
owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of the forfeiture, not the property." Id.
(KennedyJ, concurring injudgment). Contrary to Justice Stevens, howeverJustice Kennedy
determined that the distinction was appropriate because its purpose is to "quiet title to
forfeitable property in one proceeding." Id. This determination, however, runs contrary to the
reasoning set forth by the Court in Republic Nat'1 Bank. See supra note 195 and accompanying
text (discussing jurisdictional rationale for in rem distinction). Moreover, Justice Kennedy's
determination fails to explain why the majority in Ursery could rely on this distinction in the
double jeopardy context.
199. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 616 n.9 (stating that reliance on in rem fiction would be
misplaced).
200. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that Court's holding in Ursery erodes Fifth Amendment guarantee prohibiting double
jeopardy).
201. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. See Various Items of Peisonal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1930).
203. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 355 (1984).
204. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
205. See id. at 2163 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in Ursery, Justice Stevens feared that merely labeling the statute "civil"
or "in ren" may have been enough to avoid characterizing it as
punitive for double jeopardy purposes.0 6
Justice Stevens' comments raise an important issue concerning
forfeitures of facilitating property: Where do officials draw the line
as to what facilitates a drug transaction? If someone uses a car to
travel to the bank to withdraw money for use in a later drug transac-
tion, does the car constitute facilitating property? If an individual
uses a road map on a computer Internet program to locate where a
drug transaction will occur, does the computer facilitate the drug
transaction? Although courts never might face these particular
circumstances, the hypothetical situations posited serve to highlight
the potential for abuse by officials.
C. Ursery "Stands Austin on Its Head"207
In Ursery, the majority discredited the circuit courts' reliance on
Austin, because "[it] was decided solely under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment... which we never have under-
stood as parallel to, or even related to, the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.""' The majority narrowly construed the
Court's holding in Austin, determining that the only effect of Austin
was to subject the forfeiture of facilitating property to the limitations
of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,2°0 not the
Double Jeopardy Clause.10
The majority's contention that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments
never have been understood as being "parallel" to each other,
however, misses the point The Sixth and Ninth Circuits did not find
that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were parallel to each other in
their entirety, only that the definition of the word "panishment"
within the two Amendments was parallel.2 ' As Justice Stevens
observed, "[i]t is difficult to imagine why the Framers of the two
206. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. See id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. Id at 2146.
209. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fees
imposed.").
210. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2143-44 (rejecting relevancy of characterizing proceeding as civil
or criminal and focusing on forfeiture itself to determine if it constituted punishment).
211. See generally United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on
Austin for purposes of analysis of civil forfeiture statute under both Eighth and Fifth
Amendments), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995) (relying
on Austin for analysis of civil forfeiture statute under Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Because both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits relied on
Austin in their decisions involving the Fifth Amendment, they implied that the definition of
"punishment" is the same for purposes of both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
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amendments would have required a particular sanction not to be
excessive, but would have allowed it to be imposed multiple times for
the same offense. '212  Justice Stevens further noted that it would
"make little sense" to find that civil forfeiture may be punishment
under the Excessive Fines Clause but not under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.13 Indeed, for the Framers of the Constitution to use the
word "punishment" in the context of the Fifth Amendment and to use
the same word just three amendments later, meaning something
entirely different, makes no sense at all.
214
The majority in Ursery also determined that the approaches in
Austin and Halper were "wholly distinct" due to the different purposes
of the respective analyses under the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause and the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause.
21 5
The majority maintained that analysis of a civil sanction under the
Excessive Fines Clause asks whether a sanction is "so large as to be
'eessive,"' and analysis in the doublejeopardy context asks whether
the sanction has any remedial goals.2 6 Concluding that Austin's
holding applied only to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, the majority held that Austin could not be applied in the
double jeopardy context. 7
The majority, however, failed to recognize that Austin expressly
relied on the rule in Halper that a sanction is classified as punishment
if it serves any punitive ends.21 In Austin, the Court quoted Halper,
stating "'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
212. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2157 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 2157 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Similarly, at oral argument for Uirsery, Justice Scalia maintained that he could not
understand why the Drafters would write that what constitutes punishment for Eighth
Amendment purposes does not constitute punishment for Fifth Amendment purposes. See 64
U.S.L.W. 3751, 3752 (U.S. May 14, 1996).
215. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146 (stating that "categorical approach under the Excessive
Fines Clause [is] wholly distinct from the case-by-case approach of Halpe?').
216. See id.
217. See id. at 2147. "Forfeitures effected under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) are
subject to review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment after Austin; this does not
mean, however, that those forefeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment .... [W] e
decline to import the analysis of Austin into our doublejeopardyjurisprudence." Id.
218. The Court asserted that in Austin it "explained that the difference in approach[es
between Halper and Austin] was based in a significant difference between the purposes of our
analysis under each constitutional provision." Id at 2146. The footnote that the majority relied
on, however, nowhere stated that the two tests were "wholly distinct." SeeAustin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 622 n.14 (1993) (determining not to follow Halper but rather to focus on
§ 881(a) (4) and (a)(7)). It merely stated that the "focus [is] on § 881(a) (4) and (a)(7) as a
whole" rather than "'the sanction as applied in the individual case,"' because it "involved a small,
fixed-penalty provision." Id. (quoting in part United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
These are just two different approaches to the same test that the Court set forth in Halpe, they
are not two "wholly distinct" tests.
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either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment. '' 219 The
Court in Austin applied the general analysis in Halper, concluding that
the forfeiture of facilitating property did not "serve [] solely a remedial
purpose."221 This analysis is identical to that used in Halper, and
nowhere in Austin does the Court state or imply that it is "wholly
distinct."
If the majority believed that the forfeiture of facilitating property
did not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes,
perhaps it should have overruled Austin. Contrary to the majority's
assertion in Ursery, Austin applied Halper's analysis to the identical
statute under review in Ursery,221 concluding that it was punishment
for Eighth Amendment purposes.222 Thus at least in Austin, the
Court understood the definition of "punishment" to be identical for
purposes of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. As Justice Stevens
stated in his dissent in Ursery, the majority has "ignore[d] the fact that
Austin reached the opposite conclusion as to the identical statute
under review here."
223
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF URSERY
Civil forfeitures of proceeds and facilitating property pursuant to
§ 881 have proven to be an effective tool in the nation's war against
drugs, giving law enforcement agencies an edge against suspects and
defendants. It has become common practice for the government to
institute parallel criminal proceedings based on drug charges and civil
forfeiture proceedings against property owned by the same defen-
dant.224 Because of the usefulness of these parallel civil forfeiture
proceedings, the Court's decision in Ursery likely was driven by policy,
219. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989))
(emphasis added).
220. See id. The Court in Austin made it clear at the outset of its decision that it was relying
on Halpefs analysis of punishment:
We said in Halper that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive
or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term." We
turn, then, to consider whether, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified,
forfeiture was understood at least in part as punishment and whether forfeiture under
§§ 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) should be so understood today.
IdM at 610-611 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (citation omitted).
221. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7).
222. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
223. Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
224. See Andrew Subin, The Double Jeopardy Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of Crime-Related
Property: The Gradual Realization of a Constitutional V'iolation, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 253, 253
(1996) (noting that government has adopted civil forfeiture as common tool for dealing with
criminal defendants).
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rather than dictated by precedent. Had the Court found the civil
forfeiture statutes unconstitutional in Ursery, it would have invalidated
an extremely effective law enforcement tool used in the war against
drugs. Additionally, such a ruling would have raised doubts as to the
constitutionality of similar statutes at all levels of government.2
Due to these considerations, the Court chose to find that neither of
the forfeitures constituted punishment,"' thereby undercutting the
Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy, "a guarantee
deemed fundamental by the Founders."227
A. Defendants Face More Obstacles
Because the Court in Ursery held that civil forfeitures pursuant to
§ 881 do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes, it
is likely that individuals facing drug charges now will be forced to
defend themselves in two separate proceedings. Consequently, the
government obtains a tactical advantage over defendants.228 Essen-
tially, the government can use the civil trial as a test run for its
criminal case against a defendant. Additionally, prosecutors can hone
their trial strategies and perfect their presentation of evidence
through successive trials.2  The government also may pursue a
subsequent civil forfeiture action out of dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the criminal prosecution. In more extreme instances, the
government may-use the threat of a parallel civil forfeiture action as
leverage against criminal defendants. This may be used to encourage
225. Every state has a civil forfeiture statute, many of which are modeled after § 881. See
Brief of the State of Connecticut, 47 States, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as Amici
Curiae In Support of Petitioner, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996). Even if
states do not have civil forfeiture statutes modeled after § 881, they still would face double
jeopardy challenges based on the decisions of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. See id.
226. If the Court had chosen a middle route, holding that the forfeiture of facilitating
property was punishment and that forfeiture of proceeds was not, the Court would have created
additional issues for lower courts to address in the future. Defendants facing parallel
proceedings then would argue that the property subject to forfeiture was facilitating, not
proceeds of drug transactions. The courts thus would be faced with sorting out the difference
between the two types of proceedings and, in many circumstances, would have to decide what
to do when property could constitute both facilitating property and proceeds.
227. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (StevensJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. Parallel proceedings also will increase the cost of prosecuting drug offenders, which will
be passed on to taxpayers. See Comment, Tort Lau--Civil Liability for Criminal Acts-Illinois
Expands Civil Liability of Drug Traffickers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 699, 703 (1996) ("In those cases in
which duplicative criminal (and) civil forfeiture... actions are brought, the parallel proceedings
may lead to inefficient and excessive resource expenditures."). But seeJanice T. Martin, Final
Jeopardy: Merging the Civil and Ciminal Rounds in the Punishment Game, 46 FLA. L. REv. 661, 685
(1994) ("If the Court or Congress decides to force forfeiture strictly into the criminal setting...
then the war on crime in America, and particularly the war on drugs, will necessarily become
more efficient and less costly.").
229. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (recognizing that "State [can] hon[e] its
trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence through successive attempts at conviction").
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plea bargaining or guilty pleas in return for the government's promise
not to pursue civil forfeiture actions against the family home or other
valuable properties.2 °  These advantages and the potential for
abuse-created as a result of Ursery-leave defendants in a vulnerable
position.
Defendants also face the burdensome task of defending themselves
in two separate proceedings. Defendants risk losing twice to the
government and are forced to spend twice as much time and money
on their defense. This burden is magnified for defendants who lack
the economic resources necessary for extensive litigation. Not only
are parallel proceedings an onerous burden, but they also diminish
defendants' likelihood of success.
B. Criminal Forfeiture Statutes Are Obsolete
By excluding Halperfrom its "long line of cases," the Court in Ursery
effectively gave its stamp of approval to all but the most poorly drafted
civil forfeiture statutes. Without Halper's solely remedial test, 89
Firearms' two-prong test provides few obstacles to civil forfeiture
statutes.3 Congress merely has to exhibit an intent for the pro-
ceedings to be civil while being careful not to provide the courts with
the "clearest proof' that the statute is punitive.232 Civil forfeitures
rarely will constitute punishment under this type of examination. 33
Because civil forfeiture statutes are, for all practical purposes,
immune from attack under 89 Firearms, it seems pointless for
legislators to draft criminal forfeiture statutes. After Ursery, prosecu-
tors can go forward with parallel civil forfeiture proceedings without
concern for double jeopardy implications. The Court's holding in
Ursery makes criminal forfeiture statutes unnecessary2" because the
government may avail itself of the more favorable burden of proof in
civil proceedings.
230. See Subin, supra note 224, at 267-68 ("[T]he government commonly uses the forfeiture
of property as a plea bargaining tool in the criminal case.").
231. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing ease with which Congress may
overcome obstacles imposed by 89 Firearms).
232. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (including Halper analysis).
233. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of showing that civil
forfeiture statute constitutes punishment under test of 89 Firearms).
234. The government will keep the existing criminal forfeiture statutes, but only for the
purpose of preserving judicial economy by combining the criminal forfeiture proceeding and
the criminal proceeding against the individual. Criminal forfeiture proceedings will be used
only in situations where the government has an extremely strong case and prosecutors are
absolutely sure that they can meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
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VIII. A MORE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE: HALPER REFINED THE
FIRST PRONG OF 89 FIREARMS
It seems more logical to conclude that Halper was not stating the
rule for the rare case, but instead was refining the two-part analysis
the Court set forth in 89 Firearms.28 5 Without Halper, the test in 89
Firearms creates extremely difficult burdens for claimants to overcome,
and imposes relatively insubstantial hurdles for the government. As
a result, all but the most poorly drafted statutes will pass 89 Firearms'
two-prong test without judicial analysis of the statute's actual charac-
ter. Including Halperwithin the majority's "long line of cases" would
give more substantive meaning to the analysis of 89 Firearms and
would level the playing field between defendants and the govern-
ment.
36
Under the first prong of 89 Firearms, the government need show
only that Congress intended the civil forfeiture statute to be remedi-
al.2" 7 The majority in Ursety merely determined that the labels and
procedures of § 881 (a) (4), (a) (6), and (a) (7) had a civil appearance,
thus passing this prong." In contrast, the Court in 89 Firearms
considered three factors in examining the civil forfeiture statute
under this prong: (1) the procedural mechanisms of the statute;
2 9
235. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1983)
(determining nature of forfeiture proceedings). In 89 Firearms, the Court first "determine[d]
whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other." Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248 (1980)) (citation omitted). Second, the Court "inquired further whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Id. at 362-63
(citation omitted).
236. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996).
237. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362 (stating standard for examining civil forfeitures).
238. See Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-48 (examining civil labels and in rem nature of proceeding).
In Ursey, the majority examined only the procedural mechanisms Congress established for
enforcing § 881 before moving on to the second prong of 89 Firearms. See id. The Court,
however, never examined the scope of the statute or its remedial alms, as it had in 89 Firearms
under this prong. See id. (discussing procedural mechanisms of § 881 under first prong of 89
Firearms without discussing scope or aims of statute). See also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364
(examining "broad remedial aims" under first prong).
239. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363 (focusing on procedure to determine intent of
Congress). In 89Frrearms, the Court determined that Congress' intent under the first prong was
"most clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established for enforcing forfeitures
under the statute." Id. The Court found that Congress had indicated its intent to create a civil
sanction "[b]y creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfeitures under section 924(d)."
Id
In Austin, the Court examined the procedures set forth by § 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) in deciding
whether they were punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. SeeAustin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 617-23 (1993) (determining that procedures included by Congress showed its
intent). The Court determined that the innocent owner defenses set forth in both sections of
the Code "serve to focus the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them
look more like punishment, not less." Id. at 618-20; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a) (7)
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(2) the scope of the statute;2 ° and (3) the remedial aims furthered
by the statute.24' Under the third consideration, the Court in 89
Firearms examined the "broad remedial aims" of the statute before
concluding that the forfeiture was a remedial civil statute.242
The analysis in 89 Firearms concerning the character of the statute
is similar to the Court's inquiry in Halper.243  It is likely that the
Court in Halperintended for its solely remedial test to refine the third
factor within the first prong of 89 Firearms, examining the remedial
alms furthered by a particular statute. This interpretation is support-
ed by the Court's decisions in Austin and Kurth Ranch, which both
suggest that Halpeis analysis should be applied to civil forfeitures. If
Halperwere to be included in the 89 Firearms analytical framework as
precedent indicates it should, the first prong would be the most
logical place.
Including Halper within the third prong of 89 Firearms gives Halper
more substantive meaning. Rather than merely examining labels and
procedures provided by Congress, courts will examine the actual
character of the statute at issue. The government will have the
burden of proving the solely remedial character of a statute, without
relying merely on the labels and procedures attached by Congress.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Ursery severely weakened the Fifth
Amendment protection against doublejeopardy. Although precedent
dictated otherwise, the Court concluded that the forfeiture of
facilitating property under § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) did not constitute
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. By narrowly
construing the issues of relevant cases, the Court decided that
(1994) (setting forth innocent owner defenses). The majority in Ursery, however, analyzed the
identical statutes and concluded that the provisions were not relevant in determining whether
the statute was punitive. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (determining that § 881(a) (6) and (a) (7)
are civil proceedings and that "clearest proof" does not exist to prove otherwise under Ward
analysis). The Court stated that although the statute "remain[s] an 'innocent owner' exception,
we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of intent to punish, is relevant
to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.
240. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363-64. In 89 Firearms, the Court determined that the civil
forfeiture statute was broader in scope than the criminal provisions under the parallel statute,
18 U.S.C. § 922. See id. at 363. "[I] t is apparent from the differences in the language of these
two statutes that the forfeiture provisions ... were meant to be broader in scope than the
criminal sanctions ... ." l&
241. See id. at 364. The Court concluded that "[k] eeping potentially dangerous weapons out
of the hands of unlicensed dealers is a goal plainly more remedial than punitive." Id.
242. See id.
243. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (assessing character and
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 287 in determining whether it constitutes punishment); 89Firearms, 465
U.S. at 364 (analyzing remedial purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)).
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facilitating the nation's war against drugs justified sacrificing the
protections afforded to defendants by the Fifth Amendment.
Consequently, drug offenders may face parallel criminal and civil
forfeiture proceedings without the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. The government may use these parallel proceedings to
obtain tactical advantages over defendants, thereby diminishing
defendants' likelihood of success. The burden of defending them-
selves in parallel proceedings will remain on defendants unless the
Court revisits the issue and re-establishes doublejeopardy protections
as mandated by the Constitution.
